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Abstract: The study will analyze how the Council of the League of Nations 
acted as a forum for discussions during the Abyssinian war (1935-1936). 
Most studies focused on the war underline the powerless of the League and 
of its Council. Moreover, the Council’s role as a forum for discussions 
during the dispute is generally overlooked. However, the Council offered 
the parties involved or with interest in the conflict the opportunity to 
express their position and test the world opinion. The paper will study this 
issue by examining the minutes of the Council’s meetings, published in the 
League of Nations Official Journal. Other sources used are the Italian 
media, and memoires and journals of Italian, French and British 
representatives. 
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Introduction 
 
A key event in understanding the collapse of the League of Nations’ 
collective security is the Italian conquest of Ethiopia (1935-1936). The war 
was part of a chain of events that questioned the League’s capacity to 
secure peace. Among them, the Manchurian crisis (1931-1932), the re-
militarization of the Rhineland (1936), the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), 
the partition of Czechoslovakia (1938-1939) and the Italian invasion of 
Albania (1939). The League proved that it was unable to protect one of its 
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members. This was because Britain and (especially) France were more 
preoccupied with keeping Germany surrounded, thus having an oscillating 
reaction towards the Italian aggression.  
Most studies discussing the Abyssinian War underline the weakness 
of the League or even tend to neglect Geneva’s role in the attempts to stop 
Italy, simply assuming that the League was destined to fail. The same goes 
for the Council, the executive body of the organization. Still, scholars 
generally tend to overlook the Council’s role as a forum for discussions 
during the Abyssinian affair. Hence, the following study raises and tries to 
answer the following question: How did the League Council act as a forum 
for discussions in the case of the Abyssinian War? The Council was indeed 
inefficient during the Abyssinian War, but it offered the countries involved 
or with interest in the conflict the opportunity to express their position and 
test the world’s opinion. This was a responsibility envisioned by the British 
Foreign Office in its 1918 memorandum, which described a League of 
Nations as “a meeting of Governments with Governments” 1 , as Alfred 
Zimmern, one of the League’s architects, wrote the memorandum2. 
The paper will take into account the minutes of the Council’s 
meetings, published in the League of Nations Official Journal, which 
contain the discourses of the parties involved. The focus will be mainly on 
the speeches of the representatives of Italy and Ethiopia and of the powers 
capable of safeguarding the principles of the League, France and Britain. 
Also, the Italian journal La Stampa is uniquely suited to illustrate how the 
issue was perceived by Rome and what kind of information the Italian 
public received from its authorities. Together, they offer a better 
explanation for Italy’s position within the Council. Complementary sources 
                                               
1 Alfred Zimmern, The League of Nations and the Rule of Law: 1918-1935, London, 
Macmillan and Company, 1936, p. 203. 
2 Public Record Office, FO 371/4353, 149-51, quoted in Hidemi Suganami, The domestic 
analogy and world order proposals, Vol. 6, Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 85, 
accessed February 16, 2016 at 
https://books.google.ro/books?id=COnjtpJZLLIC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=
false. 
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utilized are memoires and journals of Italian, French and British 
representatives. 
 
Literature review 
 
The interwar period offers the first contributions on the League and 
its Council’s role in the dispute between Italy and Ethiopia. Spencer’s 
study
3
 is the most valuable source for Geneva’s activity during the 1935-
1936 crisis. However, the limits of the interwar analyses are their 
descriptive character, offering merely a broad presentation of what the 
League and its committees tried to implement. 
 Post-war studies attempt to understand the reasons why the League 
and the Council failed to take action against Italy and why their measures 
were inefficient. Since military intervention seemed elusive, scholars 
generally focused on the sanctions imposed on Italy. In the 1960s, we have 
the first study on this matter. Thus, Braddick
4
 concluded that the lack of 
efficient economic sanctions, especially on oil and coal, was not only 
France’s fault, but that the British were equally reluctant towards such 
measures directed against a state deemed useful in maintaining the status 
quo.  
A similar point of view can be seen in Harris’s analysis5, which 
supports the idea that the apparent British involvement was meant to 
impress international opinion. Harris also made the first significant attempts 
to analyze the debates within the League. In the 1970s, Baer
6
 continues 
these attempts, especially in his 1976 study. Baer is criticizing both France 
                                               
3  John H. Spencer, “The Italian-Ethiopian Dispute and the League of Nations”, in 
American Journal of International Law, Vol. 31 (1937), No. 4. 
4Henderson B. Braddick, “The Hoare-Laval Plan: A Study in International Polities”, in The 
Review of Politics, Vol. 24 (1962), No. 03. 
5  Brice Harris, The United States and the Italo-Ethiopian Crisis, Stanford, Stanford 
University Press, 1964. 
6  George W. Baer, “Sanctions and security: The League of Nations and the Italian-
Ethiopian war, 1935-1936”, in International Organization, Vol. 27 (1973), No. 2; G. W. 
Baer, Test Case: Italy, Ethiopia, and the League of Nations, Stanford, Hoover Press, 1976.  
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and Britain for preferring appeasement and not enforcement against Italy. 
However, Ristuccia
7
, using Italian economic archives, demonstrates that a 
strong League policy for imposing oil and coal sanctions would have been 
useless without US contribution. 
 The analysis of existing literature on the League and its attempts to 
solve the Abyssinian crisis demonstrates that scholars focused mainly on 
what Geneva tried to implement, neglecting the importance of discussions 
within the international organization and its Council regarding the peaceful 
settlement of the dispute.  
 
Italy as a League of Nations member and its interest in Abyssinia  
 
Italy entered the First World War following the 1915 Treaty of 
London. However, Britain and France did not honour all their promises, 
leading to a general frustration and dissatisfaction among Italians. All these 
would eventually work in favour of Benito Mussolini. Following the 
October 1922 March on Rome, Mussolini’s Partito Nazionale Fascista 
started to take control over the state.  
As a result of the establishment of the League of Nations in 1919, 
Italy received a seat in the Council, along with France, Britain and Japan. 
Even since the early fascist period, Mussolini constantly criticized Geneva, 
considering Rome’s position within the League as one of “absolute 
inferiority”8. Despite this hostile attitude, Italy remained in the League, 
although it requested more Italian representatives in Geneva’s institutions9.  
Italy’s relations with neighbouring countries were also problematic. 
Thus, in 1923, Italy invaded the Greek island of Corfu, while Geneva failed 
                                               
7 Cristiano Andrea Ristuccia, “The 1935 Sanctions Against Italy: Would coal and oil have 
made a difference?”, in European Review of Economic History, Vol. 4 (2000), No. 1. 
8 “Il discorso”, La Stampa, November 17, 1923, p. 1. 
9 Anique H. M. van Ginneken, Historical dictionary of the League of Nations, Scarecrow 
Press, 2006, p. 114, accessed January 4, 2016 at https://books.google.dk/books?id=-
mjkuGZLhBIC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false. 
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to oppose the move. Regarding Albania, following the treaties of Tirana 
(1926 and 1927), Italy successfully transformed the small Balkan state into 
a protectorate. But the tensest relations were with Yugoslavia, particularly 
because of the Italian minority in Dalmatia and because of the incorporation 
in 1924 by Italy of the Free State of Fiume. 
In spite of these issues, Italy participated in the 1925 Locarno 
discussions, which resulted in the German acknowledgement of its western 
frontier with France and Belgium, under Italian and British guarantees. 
Still, Italy’s relatively few colonies encouraged her to seek other 
opportunities, Ethiopia becoming a possible target. But Mussolini had to 
continuously postpone his idea of an invasion of Ethiopia because of the 
danger of war and instability on the European continent
10
. 
The Four-Power Pact, through the institutionalization of cooperation 
between the great powers, was meant to offer Italy opportunity and time as 
well as an immobilization of the opposition from Europe
11
. Signed in June 
1933, it never came into effect, mainly because of French and German 
opposition. Still, German rearmament worried Mussolini, especially in 
relation to his interests in Austria. In this sense, Italy convened a meeting at 
Stresa with Britain and France. The April 1935 Stresa Front was an 
occasion for Rome and the other two major European powers to reaffirm 
their support for the Locarno Treaties. 
But at the time of the Stresa Front, Mussolini’s oscillating foreign 
policy already suffered a radical turn, Italy preparing itself for war with 
Ethiopia. Italian interests in Ethiopia were not new, considering the Italo-
Abyssinian War of 1896 which ended with Rome’s defeat. Ethiopia was not 
just a free spot in Africa in the midst of colonized territory, but also a 
member of the League since 1923. Therefore, Mussolini carefully planned 
his actions. The Walwal incident of 1934 –a military clash between Italian 
                                               
10  H. James Burgwyn, Italian foreign policy in the interwar period, 1918-1940, 
Greenwood Publishing Group, 1997, p. 80, accessed January 4, 2016, 
https://books.google.dk/books?id=PNHxISN-dmQC&printsec=frontcove 
r#v=onepage&q&f=false. 
11 Ibidem. 
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and Ethiopian troops in an undetermined border region– was the perfect 
occasion to put pressure on Ethiopia. The importance given by Italy to the 
conquest of Ethiopia is reflected in Mussolini’s words, who considered the 
acquired territory “the jewel of the regime” and the respective period “the 
romantic years of fascism”12.  
 
The Council’s position on the Italo-Abyssinian dispute before the war 
 
 After the Walwal incident, relations between the two countries 
continued to be problematic, a fact illustrated by the Ethiopian 
Government’s January 3, 1935 telegram to the secretary-general of the 
League. The telegram expressed Addis Ababa’s concern following the 
advancement of the Italian army on Gerlogubi
13
. Less than two weeks after, 
the memorandum of January 15 suggested that the problem should be 
brought before the Council
14
. However, both Italy and Abyssinia agreed 
initially to solve their disputes by using the 1928 Italo-Ethiopian Treaty of 
Conciliation and Arbitration. This was a solution previously rejected by the 
Italian government
15
. In other words, the Italian dictator finally agreed to 
apply the provision of the 1928 treaty in order to avoid discussions in the 
Council. 
The two letters sent by the two sides to the secretary general and 
presented to the Council members on January 19 show that Italy was using 
the 1928 treaty as a way of postponing any discussions in the Council on 
the matter. Thus, the Italian representative Baron Pompeo Aloisi argued 
that “the discussion of the Abyssinian request would not facilitate in any 
                                               
12 Galeazzo Ciano, Diario. Volume secondo. 1941-1943, Milano, Roma, Rizzoli Editore, 
1946, p. 38. 
13 “Telegram dated January 3rd, 1935, from the Abyssinian Government to the secretary-
general”, in League of Nations Official Journal, Vol. 16, No. 2, 1935, p. 252. 
14  “Memorandum by the Imperial Abyssinian Government on the Incidents at Walwal 
between November 23rd and December 5th, 1934”, in League of Nations Official Journal, 
Vol. 16, No. 2, 1935, p. 258. 
15 J. H. Spencer, op. cit., p. 615. 
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way the continuance of the direct negotiations”16. Ethiopia, on the other 
hand, had no choice and accepted the postponement of the Council’s 
discussion with regard to the dispute. It could only hope that Italy “is 
prepared to take all expedient measures and confirm or give all useful 
instructions to the avoidance of fresh incidents”17 . The situation in the 
Italian media, however, reflected another situation. For example, at the 
beginning of the following month, La Stampa wrote about Ethiopian 
massing of troops
18
 and about Abyssinian hatred towards Europeans
19
.  
 Italian military movements and the failure of direct negotiations 
between the two sides convinced Addis Ababa to request the Council’s 
arbitration in March. It underlined, in the letter to the secretary general, its 
willingness “to act in accordance with the counsels and decisions of the 
League of Nations” 20 . Although the Council did debate the Ethiopian 
request in its April 15 extraordinary session, it decided to discuss the 
dispute during the May session, since “the two parties had both made 
perfectly clear declarations as to their pacific intentions”21 . Italy, using 
Article 15 of the Covenant, argued that there is no need for the Council to 
examine the Ethiopian request since the issue was already submitted to 
arbitration
22
.  
The Italian representative did not mention anything about Ethiopia’s 
claims that military movements were taking place in Eastern Africa. Baron 
Aloisi just referred to the Italian telegram sent to the secretary general, and 
                                               
16  “Eighth Meeting (Private, Then Public) Eighty-Fourth Session of the Council”, in 
League of Nations Official Journal, Vol. 16, No. 2, 1935, p. 162. 
17 Ibidem, p. 163. 
18  “Una nuova aggressione etiopica contro un nostro posto di guardia”, La Stampa, 
February 11, 1935, p. 1. 
19 “L’odio abissino contro gli europei e la minaccia di nuove razzie”, La Stampa, February 
11, 1935, p. 1. 
20  “Letter, dated March 17th, 1935, from the Ethiopian Government to the secretary-
general”, in League of Nations Official Journal, Vol. 16, No. 5, 1935,  p. 572.  
21 “First Meeting (Private) Eighty-Fifth (Extraordinary) Session of the Council”, in League 
of Nations Official Journal, Vol. 16, No. 5, 1935, p. 548. 
22 Ibidem, p. 547. 
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only after Teclé-Hawariate, the representative of Ethiopia, mentioned the 
issue in front of the Council
23
.  
While admitting that Italy did accept arbitration in accordance with 
the 1928 treaty, the Ethiopian representative complained that the Italian 
government avoided a reply in the process of immediately designating the 
arbitrator
24
. Still, Ethiopia refrained from being too critical. It only 
requested assurance from Italy that its actions were “sincerely friendly”25, 
while simultaneously making a discreet suggestion that the Covenant 
should be applied to the dispute
26
.  
France, represented by minister of foreign affairs Pierre Laval, and 
Chile agreed with the president’s proposal that the dispute should be 
discussed during the May session and, thus, declined the request of placing 
the Italo-Abyssinian issue on the Council’s current agenda27 . However, 
while approving the postponement of discussions, the British and Spanish 
representatives, Sir John Simon and Salvador de Madariaga, shared with 
the Council members their concerns. Simon, thus, talked about the risk of 
entering the May session without progress
28
. The Spanish representative 
even suggested that one of the states could be “in a state of subjectivity”29, 
referring here to Ethiopia. Indeed, Aloisi would privately warn Anthony 
Eden, British minister for League of Nations affairs, about the gravity of 
the situation, stating that the entire prestige of the regime was at risk for 
Italy, not just a colony
30
. 
 During its May 25 meeting, the Council finally discussed the issue. 
The result was the approval of two resolutions. Through the first resolution, 
the Council requested the secretary general to report to its members all the 
                                               
23 Ibidem.  
24 Ibidem, p. 548. 
25 Ibidem. 
26 Ibidem. 
27 Ibidem, p. 549. 
28 Ibidem. 
29 Ibidem. 
30 Anthony Eden, The Eden Memoirs: Facing the Dictators, London, Cassell, 1962, p. 206. 
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information he may receive from the two sides, especially about the work 
of the arbitrators
31
. The second resolution stated that the Council will meet 
if the fifth arbitrator will not be selected by July 25, or if the agreement by 
means of arbitration or conciliation would not have occurred by August 
25
32
. The meeting was an occasion for Italy to point out that its military 
manoeuvres are “just steps to put the territory of its colonies into a state of 
defence”33.  
Nevertheless, the representatives of France and Britain, Laval and 
Eden, expressed their hopes that the two parties are still capable of finding 
a solution through the 1928 treaty
34
. London and Paris had special interests 
in Ethiopia, considering their tripartite treaty with Italy (1906) regarding the 
African state. Some interwar scholars like Keirstead saw the pact as a key 
explanation for French and British passivism
35
. However, the dispute 
should be seen in the light of the later events. The two democratic powers 
considered Italy a vital ally in keeping Hitler in check and Mussolini’s firm 
attitude in the case of the 1934 Austrian crisis strengthened this belief. The 
German denunciation of the disarmament clause of the Versailles Treaty 
made matters even worse. The Italian dictator’s confidence was evident in a 
speech given in May that denied an Anglo-French approach on the 
Abyssinian issue and announced the sending of as many troops as 
necessary
36
. Eden believed that Mussolini should have been in no position 
to say this
37
. 
Despite the optimism showed during the May 25 session, the 
arbitration process did not make progress. During the July 31 session, 
                                               
31 “Fifth Meeting (Public) Eighty-Sixth Session of the Council”, in League of Nations 
Official Journal, Vol. 16, No. 6, 1935, p. 640. 
32 Ibidem. 
33 Ibidem, p. 641. 
34 Ibidem, p. 642. 
35 Stella Keirstead, “The League and Abyssinia”, in The Dalhousie Review, Vol. 16, No. 3, 
1936, pp. 326-327. 
36 “Chiare fermissime parole del Duce sull’Africa Orientale”, La Stampa, May 15, 1935, p. 
1. 
37 A. Eden, op.cit., p. 204. 
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Gaston Jèze, the French representative of Ethiopia
38
, blamed the Italian 
government for the failure of the arbitration attempt
39
. The meeting did not 
have a practical result since the Council decided to follow Laval’s 
suggestion, by now French prime-minister, to allow the members of the 
Council and especially the representatives of France and Britain, to find a 
solution that would enable the Council to implement its May resolution
40
. 
Hence, the Council’s August 3 extraordinary session began with the 
presentation of the two resolutions negotiated by Britain and France. The 
first resolution regulated the task of the Commission of Conciliation and 
Arbitration while the second stated that the Council will meet on September 
4 to examine the situation
41
.  
During the meeting, details of the Franco-British plan were revealed 
by Eden. Thus, while being convinced that the appointment of the fifth 
arbitrator will be a successful move, he announced that the signatory 
powers of the 1906 Agreement will commence conversations
42
. Moreover, 
he gave assurance that his country “will devote every effort to securing a 
pacific settlement of this dispute in harmony with the principles of the 
Covenant”43. Britain was in a particularly difficult position because of the 
pro-League result of the Peace Ballot, published in June. In other words, it 
had to come to terms with Italy, while supporting Geneva in the same time. 
This made British foreign policy more inclined than France’s to enforce the 
League’s collective security. Also, the British treated Germany less as a 
problem than their French counterparts. An example in this regard would be 
the June 1935 Naval Agreement with Berlin, which officially allowed 
                                               
38  Jèze was a French law professor at Sorbonne who represented Ethiopia before the 
League. See G. W. Baer, Test Case: Italy, Ethiopia and the League of Nations, Stanford, 
Hoover Institution Press, 1976,  p. 56. 
39  First Meeting (Private) Eighty-Seventh (Extraordinary) Session of the Council”, in 
League of Nations Official Journal, Vol. 16, No. 8, 1935, p. 965. 
40 Ibidem, p. 965. 
41  “Second Meeting (Public) Eighty-Seventh (Extraordinary) Session of the Council”, 
League of Nations Official Journal, Vol. 16, No. 8, 1935, pp. 967-968. 
42 Ibidem, p. 969. 
43 Ibidem. 
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Hitler to violate the Versailles limits regarding the German navy. In the 
same month, the Maffey Committee which was dealing with British 
interests in Ethiopia noted that London did not have reasons to oppose an 
Italian annexation of Ethiopia, since Britain had no essential interests in the 
region
44
. It is believed that Mussolini would have obtained a copy of the 
document
45
. 
As agreed, the Council met on September 4 in a session that 
eventually became a turning point of the conflict. Relevant for this session 
was the decision of the Italo-Ethiopian Commission of Conciliation and 
Arbitration issued a day before, which stated that neither Italy nor Ethiopia 
was responsible for the incident
46
. The session revealed that the 
negotiations between France, Britain and Italy had failed. Eventually, this 
became clearer. As Aloisi wrote in his journal Mussolini’s words, they 
stated that Italy sought to gain time and not an agreement, unless they could 
get everything, including the emperor’s decapitation47. Although both Eden 
and Laval stressed their countries’ loyalty towards the League, the British 
representative mentioned for the first time the possibility of modifying the 
Ethiopian border, arguing that “we did not examine, but we did not in any 
way exclude the possibility of territory adjustments to which Italy and 
Ethiopia might agree” 48 . It can be implied from this statement that 
discussions between the three powers were already setting the stage for the 
Hoare-Laval Pact later in December.  
The September 4 session also revealed British and French interests 
in maintaining Italy as an ally. As Laval’s pointed out, the ideal solution 
would be the one “affording Italy the satisfaction she can legitimately claim 
                                               
44 H. J. Burgwyn, op.cit., p. 117. 
45 A. Eden, op.cit., p. 241. 
46  “Decision of the Italo-Ethiopian Commission of Conciliation and Arbitration, dated 
September 3rd, 1935”, in League of Nations Official Journal, Vol. 16, No. 11, 1935, p. 
1355. 
47 Pompeo Aloisi, Journal (25 Juillet 1932 Juin 1936) baron Aloisi, Paris, Plon, 1957, p. 
293. 
48 “First Meeting (Private, Then Public) Eighty-Eighth Session of the Council”, in League 
of Nations Official Journal, Vol. 16, No. 11, 1935, p. 1134. 
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without disregarding the fundamental rights of Ethiopian sovereignty”49. 
Prime Minister Laval had more serious problems to solve at that moment, 
considering France’s financial and political turmoil. Thus, his country could 
not afford forceful actions against Italy. Moreover, Laval secretly assured 
Mussolini in January 1935 of France’s disinterest regarding Ethiopia 50 . 
Eden would find out later about this from the Italian dictator
51
. 
What made the September 4 session so important was Italy’s 
surprising accusations: “a State such as Ethiopia can have equality neither 
of rights nor of duties with civilized States”52. Up to the Commission of 
Conciliation and Arbitration’s decision, Rome used the Walwal incident as 
a justification for its military manoeuvres. Since the commission did not 
attribute the start of the dispute to either of the two parts, Italy had to 
change its strategy and seek new arguments against Addis Ababa. It was 
also the first time when the Italian representative argued in the Council that 
Ethiopia is a threat to Italian possessions
53
. Jèze, the representative of 
Ethiopia, was so surprised that he could hardly even comment on the 
accusations. He pointed to the danger of creating a precedent in terms of 
debating in the Council a state’s own politics, the way in which it deals 
with its affairs and the requesting of a death sentence based on this
54
. 
According to Aloisi’s journal, it was Laval who suggested the attack55. The 
French prime-minister would have also confessed his desire to remain 
faithful to the Stresa Front and the Italo-French friendship
56
. 
The tense situation within the Council continued the next day. 
While the Ethiopian representative was criticizing Italy for its aggressive 
                                               
49 Ibidem, p. 1135. 
50 Donald Cameron Watt, “The Secret Laval-Mussolini Agreement of 1935 on Ethiopia”, 
in Middle East Journal, Vol. 15, No. 1, 1961, p. 71. 
51 A. Eden, op.cit., p. 224. 
52 “First Meeting (Private, Then Public) Eighty-Eighth Session of the Council” in League 
of Nations Official Journal, Vol. 16, No. 11, 1935,  p. 1136. 
53 Ibidem. 
54 Ibidem, p.  1137. 
55 P. Aloisi, op.cit., p. 298. 
56 Ibidem. 
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position, the Italian representative left the Council table
57
. The September 5 
meeting was the first time when the Soviet Union, through Maxim Litvinov 
commented on the issue. Litvinov expressed his regret that one of the states 
involved in the dispute is a country with which Moscow was having 
friendly relations
58
. The fact that the representative of the USSR is 
mentioning the preservation of peace on the European continent
59
, 
illustrates Moscow’s fear of Germany, whom it replaced in the Council in 
1934. Moreover, after the Italo-Abyssinian War, the USSR proposed to 
Italy an Italo-Franco-Soviet pact as condition for removing Moscow’s 
sanctions
60
. Nonetheless, referring indirectly to the Manchurian Crisis of 
1931, Litvinov warned that “the repetition of that precedent would certainly 
have a cumulative effect and, in its turn, would stimulate new conflicts 
more directly affecting the whole of Europe”61. 
 
The Abyssinian War in the Council’s debates 
 
 With the war starting on October 3, 1935, the Council was required 
to drastically change its policy and speed up the process of finding a 
solution to the conflict. This was, however, not an easy task. On the first 
Council meeting after the start of the war, on October 5, Italy, as expected, 
accused Ethiopia of being the true aggressor
62
. Still, the Italian 
representative went as far as blaming the debates within the League for the 
outbreak of the war: “The responsibility for this situation must be attributed 
to the encouragement which Ethiopia thought she could find in the 
                                               
57 “Second Meeting (Public) Eighty-Eighth Session of the Council”, in League of Nations 
Official Journal, Vol. 16, No. 11, 1935, p. 1140. 
58 Ibidem. p. 1142. 
59 Ibidem. 
60 Cerruti to Rome, 5/22/36: MAE (Rome) AP URSS b19 f1, quoted in J. Calvitt Clarke 
III, “Italy and the Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 23, 1939”, in Selected Annual Proceedings 
of the Florida Conference of Historians, Vol. 3/4, December 1996, p. 35. 
61 “Second Meeting (Public) Eighty-Eighth Session of the Council” in League of Nations 
Official Journal, Vol. 16, No. 11, 1935, p 1142. 
62 “Fifth Meeting (Private, Then Public) Eighty-Ninth Session of the Council”, in League 
of Nations Official Journal, Vol. 16, No. 11, 1935, p. 1210. 
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discussions at Geneva”63. This statement is in a striking opposition with 
Mussolini’s October 2 discourse. Referring to the way Italy was treated 
after the First World War and to the 1896 Italo-Abyssinian War, Il Duce 
said that “We have been patient for thirteen years (...) With Ethiopia we 
have been patient for forty years! That is enough!”64 Italy was facing a 
difficult task, namely to justify its actions in front of the League, while 
preparing in the same time the Italian public for the invasion. 
On the other hand, the Ethiopian representative reinforced his 
government’s position, namely that the provisions of the Covenant should 
be applied by the Council
65
. Teclé-Hawariate made an interesting remark 
about the small states, namely that if the actions against Ethiopia would 
triumph, these countries could one day become as vulnerable as Ethiopia, 
facing “the risk of becoming the prey of a powerful and unscrupulous 
aggressor”66. Although Teclé-Hawariate was using this argument to pursue 
the Council to take action, his fear was eventually confirmed by the future 
developments.  
Italy used all its possibilities to slow down any discussion or 
measures, such as through attempts to postpone the discussions on the 
reports of the Committee of Thirteen and of the Committee of Six
67
. The 
opinions about the war were mixed within the League. Some members 
argued that Italy was seeking a bit of colonial prestige and revenge for the 
1896 defeat, while others believed that Rome was facing economic 
difficulties and could barely fight a lasting war. In these conditions, many 
                                               
63 Ibidem, p. 1211. 
64 “Abbiamo pazientato tredici anni (...) Con l'Etiopia, abbiamo pazientato quarant’anni! 
Ora basta!”. “Un’ ora solenne sta per scoccare”, La Stampa, October 3, 1935, p. 1. 
65 “Fifth Meeting (Private, Then Public) Eighty-Ninth Session of the Council” in League of 
Nations Official Journal, Vol. 16, No. 11, 1935,  p. 1212. 
66 Ibidem, p. 1213. 
67  “Sixth Meeting (Private) Eighty-Ninth Session of the Council”, League of Nations 
Official Journal, Vol. 16, No. 11, 1935, p. 1215. The committee of thirteen was formed of 
the Council members minus Italy, having to prepare a report on the issue. The committee 
of six was established to analyze the new developments brought by the start of the war. 
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advocated for feeble sanctions that would not distance Italy and would not 
start a war, counting that Mussolini would, thus, compromise
68
. 
On October 7, Italy tried again to portray Ethiopia’s accession to the 
League of Nations as a mistake, suggesting even “the possibility of 
rectifying that mistake” 69 . This meant legal measures regarding Addis 
Ababa’s membership in the League. A frequent theme used by Aloisi was 
slavery
70
. Although slavery was indeed still an issue in Ethiopia, Italy’s 
repeated remarks on the matter were exaggerated. Both the League’s 
Advisory Committee of Experts and the Committee of Experts on Slaves 
recognized Addis Ababa’s progress, although slow, in relation to the fight 
against slave trade and slavery
71
. Ethiopia again stressed its weakness, 
poverty and lack of weapons, her only hope being the League of Nations
72
. 
Although the Italian dictator did not expect any actions from neither the 
Council, nor the Sanctions Committee, the two bodies enabled Italy to test 
how the wind was blowing
73
. Mussolini was, thus, observing the attitude of 
the international public towards his actions.  
In this type of debates, Italy was permanently blaming Ethiopia for 
the conflict and Addis Ababa decided to put all its hopes on the League’s 
actions. All of this changed after France and Britain proposed the Hoare-
Laval Pact. The pact offered Italy significant portions of Ethiopian territory 
and economic influence. Both Laval and Samuel Hoare, British secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs, were convinced that the League would not have 
opposed the solution
74
. Indeed, the Council discussed the proposal on 
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December 18. The debates did not have a practical nature since the pact 
was, by then, already compromised by the public reaction, Hoare resigning 
the same day. Still, it should be taken into account the way in which the 
pact was seen in relation to Geneva. Hence, although the British 
representative, Mr. Eden, stressed the obligation the League members had 
to respect in relation to the Covenant, the communication from the two 
powers admitted that the Paris agreement was the result of “the failure of 
the efforts undertaken by the League of Nations”75.  
Perhaps the most significant discourse in relation to the Hoare-Laval 
Pact was that of Wolde Mariam, the representative of Addis Ababa. Before 
the Council session, the Ethiopian Government had requested that the Pact 
should be discussed before the Assembly, but to no avail
76
. As Spencer 
points out, Ethiopia hoped it could obtain help from the smaller countries 
not represented in the Council
77
. Considering its difficult position, Ethiopia 
avoided being too critical towards the Fraco-British proposal. Nonetheless, 
it did raise the following question: “is it consistent with the Covenant that 
the Covenant-breaking State should be begged, by the League of Nations, 
to be good enough to accept a large part of its victim’s territory together 
with the effective control of the rest under the cloak of the League?”78  
Realizing that the Council was unable to stop Italy, Ethiopia 
requested “facilities to acquire more complete and more up-to-date 
defensive material than she now possesses” 79 . Such measures were 
discussed previously in the League, notably in the Convention on Financial 
Assistance, which should have allowed a state victim of aggression to 
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request financial aid
80
. However, it was clear at this point that any potential 
aid from the League would be illusory. In other words, as Baer argues, what 
could have once been an easy to manage imperial rivalry affair became a 
serious European crisis and a provocation to the European settlement
81
.  
This European crisis worsened in March 1936, with German troops 
occupying the Rhineland, a severe violation of the Versailles Treaty. The 
following month, on April 20, the Council adopted a resolution that 
confirmed the failure of the Committee of Thirteen. The resolution 
infuriated the Ethiopian representative, Wolde Mariam, who asked whether 
the League will “bow to the accomplished fact because it has been 
accomplished by a powerful State and because the victim is isolated”82. The 
Ethiopian concerns are understandable since soon after the Council 
meeting, on May 2, Emperor Haile Selassie left Addis Ababa and three 
days later Italian troops seized the Ethiopian capital.  
Tense moments were present during the discussions even after the 
conquest of Ethiopia. For example, the Italian representative’s defiance of 
the League, on May 11: “the Italian delegation cannot agree to the so-called 
Ethiopian representative being present at the Council table. Nothing 
resembling an organized Ethiopian State exists”83. Baron Aloisi withdrew 
again from the meeting. Although it lost the war, Ethiopia reaffirmed its 
loyalty towards the League
84
. This is understandable since there was 
nothing it could do for the moment, its only hope being possible future 
actions from Geneva or the neighbouring powers. In his journal, the Italian 
diplomat regarded that day as an end to the dispute, at least at a diplomatic 
level
85
. The Council meeting from May 12 was the last one where the 
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Abyssinian issue was discussed, but Aloisi already announced that he 
would leave Geneva
86
. Since the war was over, the representatives of Chile 
and Ecuador argued in favour of raising the sanctions imposed on Italy
87
.  
On July 6, the coordination committee decided that the League’s 
sanctions imposed on Italy would be raised on July 15.
88
 Later, Mussolini 
declared during his November 1, 1936 speech that “For the League of 
Nations the dilemma arises, in clear terms: either renewal or perish. Since it 
is extremely difficult that it can renew itself, for our part it can easily 
parish”.89 As a result, Italy would limit its connections to Geneva and leave 
the League in December 1937. In a desperate attempt to maintain peace, 
France and Britain recognized in 1938 Italy’s conquest of Ethiopia. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Despite the fact that it failed to safeguard the League’s collective 
security in the case of the Italo-Abyssinian War, the Council was, 
nevertheless, a forum for discussing the issue. In this sense, it was used for 
presenting and discussing the opinions of the parties involved in the 
dispute, Italy and Ethiopia, and of the League’s two democratic powers, 
Britain and France.  
Since it was the executive body of the League, The Council was 
used by Italy as a way of postponing Geneva’s efforts to solve the crisis. It 
was also an occasion for Mussolini to test the reaction of the world opinion. 
Moreover, Italy revealed, officially and for the first time, its aggressive 
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policy towards the African state in the Council, during the session of 
September 5. Ethiopia, on the other hand, tried to speed up the process of 
finding a solution to the conflict. Although it generally agreed with the 
suggestions of both Italy and the Council, it was explainable because of its 
difficult negotiating position. The discourses of its representatives changed 
following the Hoare-Laval pact, which showed the League’s inability to 
offer aid. Its only hope now was financial assistance, which Geneva was in 
no position to offer. 
The Council’s debates showed again that the League’s collective 
security was dependent on France and Britain. The interventions of other 
representatives, although seemingly more firm, (such as the case of the 
USSR), played a marginal role. Thus, the two democratic powers argued in 
the Council for a solution in accordance with the principles of the League. 
This was vital to the public opinion in their countries, especially for Britain. 
Still, both London and Paris argued for a solution that would satisfy Italy, 
which meant keeping Mussolini as an ally against Germany. 
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